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1 Introduction
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was an unprecedented shock to banks’ funding
opportunities. Several papers show that banks transmitted this funding shock to their borrowers.1
However, recent evidence suggests that banks did not curtail credit equally across the board.
De Haas and Van Horen (2012), Giannetti and Laeven (2012) and Liberti and Sturgess (2018)
indicate that there is significant heterogeneity in the geographical reallocation decisions of banks.
While many researchers have analyzed the role that geographical specialization plays for credit
reallocation after a funding shock, only few have focused on the impact of other types of lending
specialization (DeYoung, Gron, Torna et al., 2015; Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl, 2017;
Liberti and Sturgess, 2018). This is somewhat surprising, given the important role that loan
portfolio allocation plays in many theoretical banking models (Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott,
1986; Winton, 1999) and given the severe consequences that credit reallocation after a funding
shock might have for the real economy (Ongena, Peydro, and van Horen, 2015).
This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive and detailed analysis
of the reallocation that banks pursue across sectors and firms after a negative shock to their funding.
The particular shock we focus on is the collapse of the interbank funding market that was triggered
by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This event had a strong impact on the Belgian financial
system. Figure 1 shows that the total volume of interbank funding of banks active in Belgium
dropped from more than EUR 500 billion in August 2008, to around EUR 250 billion thirteen
months after the Lehman Brothers collapse.2
FIGURE 1 around HERE
To identify the reallocation in the supply of credit following these funding problems, we rely on
160,223 fully documented bank-firm combinations. We combine monthly bank-firm level data
from a comprehensive credit register that contains all credit granted in Belgium by all financial
1 See Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011); Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011); Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012);
Claessens and van Horen (2013); Cull and Martinez Peria (2013); Albertazzi and Bottero (2014); Allen,
Hryckiewicz, Kowalewski et al. (2014); Bertay (2014); De Haas and van Lelyveld (2014); Iyer, Peydro,
da Rocha-Lopes et al. (2014)
2 Interbank funding include overnight deposits, deposits redeemable at notice and term accounts of other
financial institutions as well as repurchase agreements.
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institutions, monthly balance sheets of these financial institutions, and annual balance sheets of
all registered firms. The richness of our data allows us to study various measures of credit growth
and makes it possible to disentangle credit supply from demand. The latter is done by saturating
the corresponding loan growth specifications with a comprehensive set of fixed effects in order to
control for credit demand (Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro et al., 2014).
We identify reallocation effects along three different lines based on a stylized expected return
equation (see Section 2.2).3 First, banks reallocate credit after a negative funding shock towards
sectors in which they have a high market share (defined as the bank’s share in total credit granted
to a sector). We find that a one standard deviation increase in sector market share reduces the
negative impact of the funding shock on credit supply by 22% for the average firm.4 The explanation
for this finding is that banks direct their attention to sectors where they can more easily extract
rents. As the funding shock increases the marginal cost of lending, banks start to prefer their
inframarginal borrowers over their marginal borrowers. Banks that face a funding shock are forced
to reduce lending, but they have an incentive to shield sectors where they can exploit their high
market share and charge relatively higher interest rates.
Second, we find that banks reallocate credit towards sectors in which they are specialized (defined
as the sector’s share in total credit granted by a bank). A one standard deviation increase in sector
specialization reduces the negative impact of the funding shock on credit supply by 8% for the
average firm.5 Banks will typically have gathered more sector-specific (hard or soft) information
in sectors where they are specialized, improving their screening abilities and reducing the need for
costly monitoring in these sectors. As such, banks that face a funding shock are forced to reduce
lending, but they have a strong incentive to shield sectors in which they are specialized and have
superior screening and monitoring skills.
Third, banks hit by a funding shock reallocate credit towards safe firms. We find that banks
3 The focus of the paper is on the reallocation effects, i.e., the heterogeneous transmission of a funding
shock. However, we also document the average (homogeneous) effect of the funding shock on bank credit
supply. For example, our results indicate that the average reduction in interbank funding (10.3%) leads to
a reduction in credit supply of 4.26 percentage points.
4 22% is the estimated average mitigation, due to a larger market share, of the average credit contraction
following an interbank funding shock. This number is computed from the 6 main regression models in
Table 5.
5 8% is the estimated average mitigation, due to sector specialization, of the average credit contraction
following an interbank funding shock. This number is computed from the 6 main regression models in
Table 5.
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transmit a funding shock less to firms with low debt levels, high collateral, and high interest
coverage ratios. A one standard deviation decrease in firm risk (for any of these measures) reduces
the negative impact of the funding shock on credit supply by on average 10%. Given that these safer
firms are likely to have higher repayment probabilities, our results suggest that a loan’s (long-term)
repayment probabilities matter when banks make lending decisions after a funding shock.
The impact of these three reallocation effects is robust to a number of alternative explanations that
might be driving loan portfolio allocations. Specifically, the banks that are hit the hardest by the
funding shock are also the largest banks in our sample. Given that size correlates positively with
having global banking activities and with the probability of getting government support during our
sample period, one could be concerned that these factors are driving our results. We provide a
number of robustness checks to ensure that our results are not driven by international diversification
choices, government interventions, or pre-crisis solvency or liquidity issues that banks might have
faced. Additionally, we show that it is unlikely that our results are driven by bank-firm specific soft
information which banks might have gathered through previous interactions with a specific firm.
As such, our findings indicate that sector market share, sector specialization and firm risk play a
more important role than firm-specific relationships when it comes to the reallocation choices of
banks during a funding shock.
After documenting these three reallocation channels, we investigate whether the magnitude of the
impact of funding shocks changes over time and whether the impact persists.6 We show that the
moderating impact of bank sector market share is almost instantaneous and stays significant until
two years after the shock. Bank sector specialization on the other hand becomes important for the
reallocation of credit after about ten months and also stays significant until two years after the
shock. The moderating effect of firm risk becomes significant three to four months after the shock.
Our results thus indicate that banks hit by a funding shock are at first more concerned with staying
afloat in the short run by focusing on loans that ensure larger cash inflows (in the form of relatively
high interest payments), while only being interested in long term profitability (and hence focusing
on protecting their sector specific knowledge) and firm risk once these short term inflows are safe.
Finally, we analyze the impact of the funding shock on firm investments and asset growth. Firms
6 The detailed timing of the reallocative impact of market-wide, bank- or borrower-specific events is rarely
investigated due to a lack of granular data, except in selected settings such as bank runs (Iyer, Puri,
and Ryan, 2012), bank mergers and acquisitions (See, e.g., Sapienza, 2002; Focarelli and Panetta, 2003;
Degryse, Masschelein, and Mitchell, 2011) or borrower lock-in (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010).
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borrowing from banks that experience a larger funding outflow have a lower investment rate and
grow slower than other firms. Importantly, this negative impact is partially offset for firms that
are borrowing from banks with a high sector market share and for large firms. In economic terms,
however, the real effects of the shock are rather moderate.
Related literature. Our paper adds to the literature in a number of ways. First, our analysis
contributes to the rapidly expanding literature on bank funding shock transmission. The existing
work on funding shocks and bank lending mainly focuses on cross-border effects through global
banks (Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011, 2012; Claessens and van
Horen, 2013; Albertazzi and Bottero, 2014; Bertay, 2014; De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2014; Liberti
and Sturgess, 2018). Others have focused on the average reduction in credit (Puri, Rocholl, and
Steffen, 2011; Iyer, Peydro, da Rocha-Lopes et al., 2014) or on the real effects of funding shocks
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl et al., 2014; Ongena, Peydro, and van
Horen, 2015). A number of recent papers show that bank-firm relationships shield firms from
credit supply shocks (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen, 2011; DeYoung, Gron, Torna et al., 2015; Liberti
and Sturgess, 2018), and that banks reallocate credit to less risky borrowers (Liberti and Sturgess,
2018) or less risky sector-region combinations (Ongena, Tumer-Alkan, and von Westernhagen, 2018)
after a liquidity shock. DeYoung, Gron, Torna et al. (2015) use a structural model to examine how
U.S community banks’ past lending decisions affect small business credit granted in times of crisis.
We add to this literature by providing a detailed overview of the reallocation of credit across sectors
and firms based on bank sector market share and bank sector specialization.
Furthermore, by showing that banks reallocate credit according to their sector market share, this
paper relates to a vast empirical literature on bank market share, market power and credit (see, e.g.,
Degryse, Kim, and Ongena (2009) for a review). We contribute to this literature by documenting
that when banks face severe funding shocks, firms borrowing from banks with a higher sector market
share are better protected against credit supply shocks. This finding entails important information
for bank competition regulators, as it illustrates a potential benefit of bank concentration within a
sector. Additionally, by showing that sector concentration matters, this result indirectly questions
the strong focus of bank competition regulators and researchers on indicators that solely focus on
the geographical dimension of bank competition.
The finding that banks reallocate credit according to sector specialization connects the bank funding
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shock transmission literature with the literature on bank lending concentration (Acharya, Hasan,
and Saunders, 2006; Degryse and Ongena, 2007; Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro, 2011; Jahn, Memmel,
and Pfingsten, 2016; Beck, De Jonghe, and Mulier, 2017). So far none of these papers comprehen-
sively assesses reallocation of credit according to sector specialization or the potential benefits and
dangers of bank lending concentration for firms. Both our paper and Paravisini, Rappoport, and
Schnabl (2017) address these issues, albeit from a different perspective. Paravisini, Rappoport,
and Schnabl (2017) document that credit supply shocks affect a firm’s exports to markets where
its lender specializes in. Our paper shows that firms that are borrowing from specialized banks
are less impacted by a bank funding shock. This is consistent with previous literature showing
that there is a potential downside to bank diversification (Laeven and Levine, 2007). Related to
this, our results emphasize that not only systemic risk and financial stability issues should be taken
into account when studying the welfare implications of bank portfolio diversification (e.g., Acharya,
2009; Wagner, 2010), but that it could also be relevant to consider the impact on firm credit supply.
This is useful information for bank regulators when deciding on lending concentration limits.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on firm characteristics and credit constraints. Researchers
have proposed various classification schemes to identify financing constraints based on firm size
and age (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven et al., 2006; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), asset tangibility
(Almeida and Campello, 2007) or leverage and cash flows (Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo, 2001;
Whited and Wu, 2006). We add to this literature by showing that collateral availability, leverage
and interest coverage matter for credit supply when bank funding is under stress. However, we
do not find any evidence that banks tighten credit supply disproportionately more for smaller or
younger borrowers when their funding is under stress. We do find that a given credit supply shock
matters more for the investment and growth of small firms than large firms, likely because the
former have fewer alternative funding sources available.
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the data in Section 2.1, provide a detailed
description of the hypotheses we want to test in Section 2.2, and discuss the empirical methodology
in Section 2.3. Next, Section 3 provides the results on the average impact of the interbank funding
shock as well as the reallocation effects. In Section 4, we focus on challenges to identification and
causality as well as the robustness of the main findings. Section 5 provides insights in the timing of
funding shock impact and the timing of the reallocation channels. Section 6 investigates whether
the funding shock has real effects on firm investment and growth. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Data, Hypotheses, and Methodology
2.1 Data
We combine information from three data sources available at the National Bank of Belgium (Bel-
gium’s central bank, henceforth NBB): The central corporate credit register, the regulatory bank
balance sheets and income statements, and firm balance sheets and income statements.
Bank-firm-month level credit data is extracted from the corporate credit register, which col-
lects information on credit granted by credit institutions and other types of financial institutions
(leasing companies, factoring companies and insurance companies) to legal entities (i.e., enterprises)
and individuals with a business activity. We only include credit institutions established in Belgium
and licensed by the NBB. This includes both branches incorporated under foreign law that are
established in Belgium and institutions incorporated under Belgian law. A credit institution needs
to provide information to the credit register on a monthly basis on all debtors to which they have
an aggregate exposure of granted credit exceeding EUR 25,000.7 We exclude firms operating in the
financial or insurance sector, public administration, education, household activities or activities of
extraterritorial entities. The final sample includes firms from sixteen sectors of which the five most
important ones are wholesale and retail trade, construction, professional activities, real estate, and
manufacturing.
We construct three credit growth measures at the bank-firm level. First, ∆% Creditbf is defined
as the logarithmic difference between the post-shock averaged (2008:9-2009:9) and the pre-shock
averaged (2007:8-2008:8) values of the granted amount by bank b to firm f. Secondly, we create a
dummy variable (Increase in creditbf ) which takes the value of one if credit growth was strictly
positive and zero otherwise. Doing so, this variable emphasizes the effect on the propensity to grant
extra credit. Thirdly, we create a dummy (Large decrease in creditbf ) which equals one if the
firm’s credit growth is in the lowest quartile of credit growth of all the bank-firm observations in
the sample (corresponding with a reduction of 15.37% or more). This variable proxies for granted
7 The Belgian corporate credit register reports two variables with monthly frequency related to the amount
of credit: the credit granted and the credit utilized. The credit granted (or authorized) is the total amount
in euro that a firm is allowed to borrow from a bank in that month. The credit utilized is the total amount
in euro that a firm is actually borrowing from the bank in that month (hence, credit outstanding). The
latter may be lower than the former when a firm has a credit line with that bank which it does not fully
draw upon. We work with the credit granted to estimate the effect of bank funding on credit supply as
changes in utilized credit are more likely to be contaminated by credit demand.
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amounts that have been reduced substantially, or matured without having been rolled over.
We also use the credit data to construct our two main variables that are expected to be im-
portant for credit reallocation after a funding shock (we derive the hypotheses in Section 2.2).
Bank sector market sharebs is defined as the ratio of total credit granted by bank b to sector s
relative to the total credit granted by all banks to sector s, in the pre-shock period (2007:8-2008:8):
Bank sector market sharebs =
∑F
f=1 Lbfs∑B
b=1
∑F
f=1 Lbfs
(1)
where Lbfs is the credit granted by bank b to firm f in sector s and F (B) is the total number of
firms (banks).
Bank sector specializationbs is defined as the ratio of total credit granted by bank b to sector s
relative to bank b’s total credit granted, in the pre-shock period (2007:8-2008:8):
Bank sector specializationbs =
∑F
f=1 Lbfs∑S
s=1
∑F
f=1 Lbfs
(2)
Bank sector market share is thus the importance of a bank for a sector, while bank sector special-
ization is the importance of a sector for a bank. Note that both variables vary at the bank-sector
level.8 In our empirical setup we use the pre-shock time averaged values of these variables, in line
with the treatment of the credit and funding measures.
Bank balance sheets and income statements are gathered from the monthly regulatory filings
(“Schema A”) at the National Bank of Belgium. We use the unconsolidated statements as these
allow us to focus on the Belgian operations of the banks. The Belgian banking market is quite
concentrated; in 2007 the share of the largest five credit institutions in total banking assets was
83% (ECB, 2008). Out of the 38 banks in the sample, 16 are domestic. Ten of the foreign banks are
subsidiaries, the remaining 12 operate as branches incorporated under foreign law. The domestic
banks are substantially larger and cover 71% (82%) of the entire corporate credit market (banking
8 Within and across sectors, we find substantial variation in sector market share and sector specialization.
The average standard deviation (across the five most important sectors) of sector market share is 6.5%
and of sector specialization is 12% (relative to average means of 2.7% and 14%). In addition, we observe
for most sectors that both large and small banks appear in the outer quartiles (or terciles) of the sector
specialization measures.
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market) during our sample period.
The interbank funding shock (∆% Interbank fundingb) is defined as the average value of interbank
funding post-shock minus the average value pre-shock, scaled by the average total assets pre-shock.
This focus on interbank funding is in line with the existing literature (see, e.g., Iyer, Peydro,
da Rocha-Lopes et al. (2014), and Ippolito, Peydro, Polo et al. (2016)).9 To avoid serial correlation
in the standard errors, we first average the monthly data for the credit growth and funding shock
measures to obtain one pre-shock observation and one-post shock observation at the bank-firm level
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). We limit the pre-shock window to thirteen months to
use the maximum amount of information available without interference from other shocks (e.g., the
turmoil in the ABCP market starting at the end of July 2007, as in Iyer, Peydro, da Rocha-Lopes
et al. (2014)).10
At the bank-firm level, the average value of the interbank funding shock is -10.3%. This outflow
is predominantly due to a reduction in cross-border interbank funding, and hardly due to liquidity
hoarding of Belgian banks who stop lending to each other. The interbank funding shock is negative
for the median bank, but positive on average. This is due to the construction of the shock as the
difference in the average value of (monthly) interbank funding over the year post- versus the year
pre-Lehman’s failure (this construction is similar to the setup of Khwaja and Mian (2008)). The
actual outflow in interbank funding in the year following the Lehman bankruptcy (i.e., the difference
between August 2009 and August 2008) has both a negative mean (-4.3%) and median (-1.5%).
The between bank variation in both interbank funding shock measures is very similar (a standard
deviation of 11.9% and 11.3%) and both shocks are strongly and significantly correlated. Hence,
the way one looks at the interbank funding shock does not significantly influence the information
9 Ippolito, Peydro, Polo et al. (2016) and Iyer, Peydro, da Rocha-Lopes et al. (2014) use the level of gross
interbank funding, whereas Acharya and Mora (2015) uses net interbank funding. Ippolito, Peydro, Polo
et al. (2016) argue that gross interbank funding is preferred over net borrowing, as the former better
captures the extent to which a bank is exposed to a run on its funding during the crisis. Moreover, in
contrast to the aforementioned authors, our set-up follows Khwaja and Mian (2008) by using the realization
of the shock (i.e., the change in interbank funding) and not the exposure to the shock. In this case, excluding
the change in interbank assets is even more important as maintaining or cutting interbank lending during
the global financial crisis is by and large the bank’s own choice and thus a decision variable rather than
an exogenous shock.
10Initially, we use symmetric windows and hence also use a thirteen month post-shock period. However, in
some parts of the analysis, we use expanding post-shock windows varying in length between one month and
24 months to analyze the timing and time-varying magnitude of the reallocation behavior. Furthermore,
we will show that the chosen length of the pre-shock window is not really important for our findings as the
turmoil in the ABCP market had no effect on the funding and credit reallocation of Belgian banks.
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that is included in the shock measure.
We further compute a number of bank characteristics based on the average over the pre-shock
window (2007:8-2008:8). We consider banks’ reliance on interbank funding (interbank funding to
total assets), bank capitalization (common equity to total assets), bank profitability (return on
average equity)11, credit risk (write-offs to total loans), liquidity ratio (interbank assets plus cash
over total assets), stable deposit funding (demand and savings deposits to total assets) and bank
size (natural logarithm of total assets).
Firm balance sheets and income statements are collected by the NBB which also performs
a number of consistency checks on the data. Almost all Belgian firms incorporated under limited
liability (irrespective of their size) are obliged to report. The most notable exceptions are sole
traders or corporations whose legal situation implies an unlimited liability for the owner (typically
very small firms). We match the last available firm balance sheet and income statement data prior
to the Lehman collapse with the bank-firm credit exposures and bank balance sheets. From the
134, 368 firms that are present in the credit register, 117, 166 file balance sheets.
We compute a measure of firm size (pre-shock total assets), age (pre-shock number of years since
incorporation), leverage (pre-shock total debt to pre-shock total assets), collateral availability (pre-
shock pledged collateral to pre-shock tangible fixed assets), financial pressure (pre-shock interest
payments to pre-shock EBIT), and implicit interest rate (pre-shock interest payments to pre-shock
financial debt).
Information on the construction of all variables is reported in Table 1, whereas summary statistics
are reported in Table 2.
TABLES 1 and 2 around HERE
2.2 Hypothesis development
In this section, we formulate our main hypotheses. To do so, we start from the following stylized
expected return equation for a loan:
11One bank in our sample has more than 100 percent return on equity pre-shock, which is in large part
driven by a very low level of common equity.
9
E[RK ] = p ∗RL + (1− p) ∗ γ − c
where E[RK ] is the expected return, the borrower is either successful (with probability, p) or fails,
RL is the contractually agreed interest rate, γ is the recovery rate upon default and c are the costs
associated with originating one unit of the loan.
A funding shock could either lead to an increase in c for a given level of funding, or a drop in
the availability of funds for a given level of c. In both situations, a bank will start cutting on
its marginal borrowers, either because the increase in funding costs makes them negative NPV
projects or because the funding constraint leads the bank to prefer the inframarginal borrower
over the marginal borrower. This inframarginal borrower can differ in three dimensions from the
marginal borrower. All else equal, borrowers with a higher repayment probability (p), borrowers
with a higher contractual interest rate (RL), or borrowers with a higher recovery value upon default
(γ) will yield a higher return.
If a bank has a dominant position in a market segment, it will be able to charge borrowers in that
segment a higher contractual interest rate. Therefore, when a bank faces a negative funding shock,
it will -all else equal- shield those borrowers in that market segment. In this paper, we look at
sectors as the relevant market segment and take banks’ sector market share as a proxy for pricing
power in that sector (implying higher RL). Panel A of Table 3 supports the assumption that a
dominant market position typically leads to higher interest rates. We find that, during the year
before the Lehman collapse, firms borrowing from banks with a larger sector market share pay
higher interest rates, holding constant other firm and bank characteristics.12 On average over the
three specifications reported in panel A of Table 3, we find that a one standard deviation increase
in sector market share leads to a 40 basis points increase in the implicit interest rate (which has
an unconditional mean of 11.6%). This leads us to formulate the following hypothesis:
H1 Bank sector market share: A bank that faces a negative funding shock will transmit this
shock relatively less to borrowers operating in sectors where the bank has a larger market share.
12Given that we do not have information on contractual interest rates, we compute firms’ implicit interest
rate from firm balance sheets - defined as interest expenses over financial debt - as a proxy for the actual
interest rate. We only include firms borrowing from one bank in this test, as for these firms the implicit
interest rate variable can more clearly be related to the specific bank and its sector market share.
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TABLE 3 around HERE
Banks that have more and better information about their borrowers are better able to assess the
repayment probabilities of these borrowers as well as their recovery values in case of default. While
more and better information is beneficial, collecting information about every borrower is costly.
However, there are economies of scale with respect to the information collection within a given
market segment. Banks that invest more resources in a given market segment gain an information
advantage in that segment that allows them to better screen prospective borrowers and to more
efficiently monitor existing borrowers (implying higher p and γ, respectively).13 Taking sectors as
the relevant market segment, we define banks’ sector specialization as the share of the sector in the
banks’ total lending. Bank sector specialization thus proxies for the amount of resources that a
bank has invested in a given sector and hence proxies for the information advantage that the bank
has gained in that sector.
We provide tentative evidence that banks in our sample have an information advantage in sectors
in which they are specialized. In Panel B of Table 3 we focus on borrowers that went bankrupt in
the year prior to the Lehman collapse. The results document that the number of bankrupt firms
in a bank-sector combination (Columns 1 and 2) as well as the bank’s share in a given sector’s
bankruptcies (Columns 3 and 4) is smaller for a bank with a higher sector specialization, holding
constant the bank’s market share and sector specificities.14 On average over the four specifications
reported in panel B of Table 3, we find that a one standard deviation increase in sector specialization
leads to a 19.4% reduction of the dependent variable (relative to its unconditional mean). This
suggests that specialized banks are better able to select good projects and will have an incentive
to protect this information advantage. This finding is in line with Berger, Minnis, and Sutherland
(2017) and leads us to formulate the following hypothesis:
H2 Bank sector specialization: A bank that faces a negative funding shock will transmit
13One could also think about p as the average repayment probability: p = φpH +(1−φ)pL, as in e.g. Sharpe
(1990). Specialization then provides the bank with a better signal of whether borrower quality is pH or
pL.
14Sector fixed effects control for the sectors’ different size and riskiness, whereas sector market share controls
for a bank’s relevance for the sector. The significant and positive relationship between sector market share
and the dependent variables in panel B could be explained due to the possibility that higher loan rates
could imply (weakly) higher bankruptcy risk for bank borrowers (see, e.g. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)).
The relation is also partly mechanical. All else equal, a bank with a larger market share in a given sector
will have a larger part of the borrowers that declare bankruptcy in that sector.
11
this shock relatively less to borrowers operating in sectors where the bank has a larger sector
specialization.
Finally, it is interesting to analyze how firm characteristics impact credit reallocation. Risky borrow-
ers might provide higher cash flows. Safe borrowers will likely have higher repayment probabilities.
Both characteristics could thus lead to shielding. Which effect dominates remains an empirical
question. Additionally, the degree of bank sector market share or specialization could be correlated
with borrower characteristics. Testing them jointly will allow us to rule out that the hypothesized
reallocation channels are not caused by the banks’ sector market share or specialization, but instead
by the specific type of the borrowers in those sectors where the banks have a higher market share
or are more specialized.
H3 Firm risk: Banks that face a negative funding shock will transmit this shock depending on
borrower characteristics.
2.3 Methodology
First, we analyze the average impact of a funding shock on bank credit supply. The average impact
will serve as a baseline when focussing on the reallocation effect of the shock across sectors. The
shock we exploit corresponds in timing with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers
in September 2008 (‘the shock’). As can be seen in Figure 1, the volume of interbank funding
of banks active in Belgium severely dropped as of September 2008. Importantly, this world-wide
interbank funding dry-up after the collapse of Lehman Brothers was exogenous to the Belgian credit
market.
To analyze the average impact of the interbank funding shock on credit supply, we run a baseline
regression of our three different credit growth measures (Creditbf ) on the bank funding shock, as
well as on a number of bank controls and firm credit demand controls. In particular, we estimate
the following equation:
Creditbf = β1 ∆% Interbank fundingb + δ Bank controlsb + αf + bf (3)
Subsequently, to analyze the within-bank heterogeneity in shock transmission, due to sector market
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share and specialization, we expand our baseline model with measures of bank sector market share
and bank sector specialization and their interaction terms with the bank funding shock:
Creditbf = β2 ∆% Interbank fundingb ∗ Sector market sharebs +
β3 ∆% Interbank fundingb ∗ Sector specializationbs +
θ1 Sector market sharebs + θ2 Sector specializationbs + αf + υb + bf (4)
We control for bank-specific characteristics in both regression models, albeit differently. When
analyzing the average impact of the funding shock (Equation (3)) we add a set of bank-specific
control variables that capture banks’ pre-crisis characteristics. We consider banks’ reliance on
interbank funding, bank capitalization, bank profitability, credit risk, liquidity ratio, stable deposit
funding, and bank size. An attractive feature of the market share and the specialization measure
in Equation (4) is that they vary at the bank-sector level. This allows us to control for observed
and unobserved bank-specific heterogeneity by including bank fixed effects (υb). We cannot do that
when studying the average effect in Equation (3) as they would subsume the funding shock.
Next to including the funding shock and bank-specific controls, we control for observed and unob-
served firm heterogeneity (including changes in firm-specific credit demand). In our most conserva-
tive setup, we do this by means of a set of firm fixed effects, αf . As such, we isolate credit supply
by investigating how banks with different degrees of funding outflow changed their lending towards
the same firm. The disadvantage of this setup is that one can only include firms that have at least
two bank relationships. This disadvantage is sizable given that 84% of the firms in Belgium borrow
from only one bank. As such, including firm fixed effects substantially reduces the sample size and
might create biased results if the multiple borrowers have vastly different characteristics than other
borrowers. Therefore, we also report results for a sample that entails the full set of bank-firm pairs
and use a firm-cluster fixed effect to control for credit demand in this setup. The single bank firms
are grouped according to the deciles of loan size in the credit register, the two-digit NACE code
and the two-digit postal code (which broadly coincides with the district level). A similar approach
is used by Edgerton (2012), Degryse, De Jonghe, Jakovljevic et al. (2018) and Morais, Peydro, and
Ruiz Ortega (2018). In case of a firm with multiple bank relationships, the cluster is defined as the
firm itself. In Section 4.1 we explicitly discuss the (dis)advantages of both setups and show that
firm-cluster fixed effects are well suited to control for firm demand.
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We expect that banks facing severe interbank funding outflows will need to reduce their credit
supply relative to banks with no interbank funding outflow. Hence, in Equation (3), we expect
β1 > 0 in regressions with ∆% Creditbf or Increase in creditbf as dependent variable; and β1 < 0
in regressions with Large decrease in creditbf as dependent variable.
Based on hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect that banks facing severe interbank funding outflows will
try to shield borrowers that operate in sectors where the bank has a larger market share or where
the bank has a larger sector specialization from the reduction in credit supply. Hence, in Equation
(4), we expect β2 < 0 and β3 < 0 in regressions with ∆% Creditbf or Increase in creditbf as
dependent variable; and β2 > 0 and β3 > 0 in regressions with Large decrease in creditbf as
dependent variable.
In order to investigate reallocation effects due to firm riskiness, we also expand model (4) with
interaction terms between the funding shock and five firm characteristics:
Creditbf = β2 ∆% Interbank fundingb ∗ Sector market sharebs +
β3 ∆% Interbank fundingb ∗ Sector specializationbs +
+
5∑
x=1
βx+3 ∆% Interbank fundingb ∗ Firm V ariablexf+
θ1 Sector market sharebs + θ2 Sector specializationbs + αf + υb + bf (5)
More specifically, we proxy for firm size, firm age, leverage, pledged collateral, and financial pressure.
We thus test if banks that faced a funding shock after the Lehman collapse, transmitted the
shock differently to their smaller, younger and/or riskier borrowers, while simultaneously shielding
borrowers in sectors where they are more present or more specialized. Including these interactions
also ensures that our sector reallocation results are not driven by (risk related) firm-level reallocation
effects.
If banks facing severe interbank funding outflows would shield their larger, older, and safer bor-
rowers from the reduction in credit supply, we expect β4 < 0, β5 < 0, and β6 > 0, β7 > 0, β8 > 0
in regressions with ∆% Creditbf or Increase in creditbf as dependent variable; and opposite signs
in regressions with Large decrease in creditbf as dependent variable.
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3 Empirical Results
3.1 Average impact of the funding shock
We first analyze the average impact of the interbank funding shock on credit supply. Table 4
presents the results using the three different credit growth indicators as dependent variable and
consists of two panels. In the upper panel, we present the results for the full sample of firms, while
controlling for firm demand by including firm-cluster fixed effects. The sample consists of 160, 223
observations from 117, 166 firms borrowing from 38 banks and grouped together in 34, 639 firm
clusters. We find that the funding shock has a statistically significant effect on credit availability
in each of the three specifications. Firms borrowing from banks facing a larger funding outflow will
face a tighter credit supply, reflected by a lower credit growth (Column 1), a lower likelihood of
seeing an increase in their granted loan amount (Column 2) and a higher likelihood to experience a
large drop in the granted loan amount (Column 3). Overall, bank funding shocks play a significant
role for the credit extension to firms operating in Belgium.
TABLE 4 around HERE
What does a point estimate of 0.414 in Column 1 of Table 4 imply in economic terms? The total
amount of granted credit prior to the shock to all firms in the sample is EUR 100 billion. The
average firm’s bank experiences a funding shock of -10.3%. A point estimate of 0.414 thus implies
that the average firm’s supply-induced drop in credit is -4.26%.15 Our results thus indicate that the
supply-shock induced ‘missing credit’ in the Belgian credit market is EUR 4.2 billion. The other
coefficients can be interpreted as changes in probabilities. A firm borrowing from a bank hit by
a funding shock of -10.3% has a 6.04 percentage points lower probability of seeing an increase in
granted credit (sample mean is 28.9%) and a 9.03 percentage points higher probability of seeing a
large decrease in granted credit (sample mean is 25%, by construction).
One, potentially crucial, difference with the common practice in the literature on bank funding
shocks is the set of fixed effects we include. In the aforementioned results, we control for credit
15The 250 billion decrease in interbank funding was mainly absorbed by a large drop in interbank assets of
slightly more than 200 billion. Another major shock absorber that insulated the Belgian corporate market
was the reduction in cross-border lending (slightly less than 40 billion).
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demand by including firm-cluster fixed effects. In Panel B of Table 4 we document the robustness
of our results when using the smaller sample of multiple bank-relationship firms using firm fixed
effects. This subsample of firms borrowing simultaneously from multiple banks consists of 47, 205
observations covering 21, 349 firms. When focusing on the smaller sample of multiple bank bor-
rowers, we find results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results in Panel A of
Table 4. The funding shock has a statistically significant effect on all three credit growth indicators
and the coefficients have a similar magnitude as in the full sample.
3.2 Bank funding shocks and credit reallocation
3.2.1 Bank sector market share and bank sector specialization
TABLE 5 around HERE
Table 5 documents the reallocation of credit across sectors after the funding shock. As in the
previous section, we report two sets of results. Panel A shows the results for the full sample of
firms. In this panel, we control for firm demand by means of firm-cluster fixed effects. Panel B
shows the results for the subsample of firms that borrow from more than one bank. In this sample,
we include firm fixed effects. In addition, in the specifications testing the reallocation channels, we
can also include bank fixed effects as the funding shock is interacted with measures computed at
the bank-sector level.
The results in Panel A of Table 5 first of all show that the pass-through of the funding shock is
less severe in sectors where the bank has a large market share. Focusing on the actual growth of
granted credit (Column 1), the coefficient of the interaction term between the funding shock and
sector market share is negative and significant, indicating that banks shield firms in sectors in which
they have a larger market share. The impact is also economically important. For example, the
point estimates in the first column imply that a one standard deviation increase in sector market
share (0.084, see Table 2) reduces the negative impact on credit growth of the average funding
shock from 4.26 to 3.37% (i.e., a reduction of 0.89 percentage points or 20%).16 Similarly, the
16The impact of a 10.3% reduction is based on the results in Table 4 : -10.3% * 0.414 = -4.26%. Based on
the results in Table 5, a one standard deviation increase in sector market share of 0.084 leads to an impact
of -10.3% * (0.414 - 1.029 * 0.084) = -3.37%.
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second and third column illustrate that the impact of a negative funding shock on the probability
of increasing granted credit (Column 2) or having a large drop in granted credit (Column 3) is less
severe for firms operating in sectors where the bank has a larger market share. A one standard
deviation increase in sector market share reduces the negative impact of the average funding shock
on the probability of seeing an increase (large decrease) in granted credit by 29% (15%).
Apart from sector market share, sector specialization also plays an important role for the pass-
through of bank funding shocks. Our results indicate that, after a negative funding shock, credit
growth is less affected in sectors that make up a relatively larger share of a bank’s portfolio. More
precisely, the results in the first column of Table 5 imply that a one standard deviation increase in
sector specialization (0.083) reduces the negative impact of a 10.3% reduction in bank funding from
4.26 to 4.07% (i.e., a reduction in impact of 0.19 percentage points or 4%). The impact of sector
specialization on the probability of increasing granted credit (Column 2) and on the probability
of a large drop in granted credit (Column 3) confirm that banks reallocate credit after a funding
shock towards firms operating in sectors in which the bank is specialized. A one standard deviation
increase in sector specialization reduces the negative impact of the average funding shock on the
probability of seeing an increase (large decrease) in granted credit by 5% (8%).
Panel B of Table 5 reports the results for the sample of firms that borrow from more than one
bank. In this sample, we can control for firm demand by means of firm fixed effects. In general,
the results in this sample go in the same direction as the ones in the full sample, have the same
economic magnitude, but become somewhat less precise.17 Further tests in Section 4.1 indicate
that this drop in precision is unlikely to be driven by the improvement in demand controls in this
sample, but are rather a consequence of the sample specificities of multiple-bank vs. single-bank
borrowers. Before digging deeper into this issue, we first examine whether firm characteristics also
lead to reallocation effects.
Overall, the results in Table 5 indicate that sector market share and specialization matter for the
pass-through of bank funding shocks to firms. Banks prefer to shield firms in sectors in which
they have a larger market share or in which they are more specialized. The results shown in
17A one standard deviation increase in sector market share in Columns 1, 2, and 3 in Panel B of Table 5
leads to an estimated average mitigation of the credit contraction caused by a 10% funding shock of 30%,
20%, and 16% respectively. Similarly, the estimated average mitigation due to a one standard deviation
increase in sector specialization is 4%, 11%, and 16% in Columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively of Panel B of
Table 5.
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Table 3 provide empirical evidence for the economic channels at work (namely rent extraction and
information advantages, respectively).
3.2.2 Firm risk
Both theoretical and empirical work has indicated that smaller firms (size), firms without track
record (age) or firms with weaker balance sheets or less collateral (risk) are more likely to be
financially constrained, due to asymmetric information between the bank and the firm. This holds
in general and is expected to be particularly relevant during periods characterized by adverse
economic shocks (e.g., tight monetary policy, economic recession, banking crisis). If the degree of
bank sector market share or specialization is correlated with the characteristics of firms that banks
lend to, it might be that the above-documented reallocation channel is not caused by the banks’
market share or specialization, but instead by the specific type of the borrowers in those sectors
where the banks are more present or specialized. In this section, we exploit the heterogeneity in
firm characteristics to explore whether banks differentially transmit a funding shock to firms in
excess of the reallocation due to bank sector market share and specialization.
We consider five firm characteristics. We proxy for firm size, age, leverage, collateral availability,
and financial pressure. We thus test if banks that faced a funding shock after the Lehman collapse
transmitted the shock more to their smaller, younger and or riskier borrowers, while simultaneously
shielding borrowers in sectors where they are more present or more specialized.
TABLE 6 around HERE
The results in Panels A and B of Table 6 indicate that banks reallocate credit to safer firms. A low
leverage ratio, a low amount of already pledged collateral and a low ratio of interest payments over
earnings all shield firms from the transmission of the funding shock. These reallocation effects are
not only statistically, but also economically significant. Focussing on the full-sample results, a one
standard deviation decrease in the leverage ratio, in the ratio of pledged collateral to fixed assets,
or in the ratio of interest payments over earnings reduces the negative impact on credit supply of
a 10.3% reduction in bank funding by 11, 6, or 12%, respectively. A change in risk characteristics
thus has a mitigating effect that is roughly equal in magnitude compared to sector specialization.
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The results in Table 6 also show that the sector reallocation documented in Section 3.2.1 is still
present after taking into account heterogeneity in the shock transmission according to firm risk.
Banks still reallocate credit towards sectors in which they are more present and towards sectors in
which they are more specialized, over and above reallocating credit towards safer firms. Hence, it
ensures that our sector reallocation results are not driven by (risk related) firm-level reallocation
effects. It also alleviates the concern that our sector reallocation findings could be driven by
characteristics that are typically rather sector-specific, such as having a high amount of collateral.
Finally, we do not find evidence that banks transmit liquidity shocks more to small firms or to young
firms. The interaction of the funding shock with firm size and age is not significant, independent of
the demand controls, which is in contrast with Khwaja and Mian (2008), Iyer, Peydro, da Rocha-
Lopes et al. (2014) and Liberti and Sturgess (2018). A potential explanation is that small firms in
Belgium have to report relatively detailed balance sheet information. As a consequence, asymmetric
information problems between (small or young) firms and banks are potentially much lower in
Belgium than in the other (emerging) countries investigated in the aforementioned papers.
FIGURE 2 around HERE
Figure 2 graphically summarizes our main results. It shows the expected impact of a 10 percent
interbank funding outflow on credit growth for a number of interesting scenarios, as predicted by
our estimations reported in Tables 4 and 6. We plot the expected average impact of such a funding
shock, but also the expected effect for each combination of high/low bank sector market share and
high/low bank sector specialization, as well as one addition with high/low firm leverage; where high
(low) is defined as a the mean + (-) one standard deviation. The transmission of the funding shock
is more than twice as large for risky firms borrowing from banks that have a low market share and
low specialization in the firms’ sector (expected effect on credit growth of -5.62 percentage points)
compared to safe firms borrowing from banks that have a high market share and high specialization
in the firms’ sector (expected effect on credit growth of only -2.66 percentage points).
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4 Challenges to identification
4.1 Demand control versus sample composition
Tables 4, 5 and 6 presented results for the full sample of borrowers in Panel A and the subset
of multiple bank borrowers in Panel B. In general, we observed that the results for the sample
of multiple firms go in the same direction as the ones for the full sample, but they become less
precise. This section shows that these less significant results are not driven by the (theoretical)
improvement in credit demand controls, but are rather a consequence of the specificities of multiple
bank vis-a`-vis single bank borrowers.
Estimations on the sample of multiple bank borrowers allow for the inclusion of firm fixed effects,
which is the most conservative way to control for firm demand and is the current standard in the
literature. However, it also implies that one can only use data for firms that borrow from more than
one bank. The vast majority of firms in Belgium (84%) borrow from only one bank. Ignoring these
firms leads to a number of concerns when it comes to testing our two main hypotheses. First of all,
focussing on the small subgroup of multiple bank borrowers might bias our results if these firms
are not representative for the full sample of borrowers. Multiple bank borrowers are indeed more
likely to be larger and older firms than single bank borrowers (Degryse, De Jonghe, Jakovljevic
et al., 2018). More importantly, they also have substitutes available, which reduces the potency
of the sector market share and sector specialization channels. Second, recent research by Degryse,
Ioannidou, and von Schedvin (2016) shows that an outside loan (i.e., a loan from another bank)
decreases a bank’s willingness to lend to this firm. This, together with the prospect of potential
coordination problems between lenders when a firm defaults, might make it less attractive to shield
multiple bank borrowers. Overall, we thus expect stronger results for the full sample than for the
multiple bank borrower sample.
We run three additional tests to examine the importance of the trade-off between using the most
appropriate sample to test our hypotheses and using the most appropriate set of fixed effects to
control for credit demand. First, we run the baseline regression analyzing the average effect of
the funding shock on the multiple bank borrower sample (as in Panel B of Table 4), but use firm
cluster fixed effects based on location-sector-size triples rather than firm fixed effects (the results
are reported in Panel A of Table 7). We do not find any difference for the average impact of the
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change in interbank funding on bank lending in the multiple bank borrower sample when using
firm cluster or firm fixed effects. This is a first indication that firm cluster fixed effects reasonably
capture firm credit demand.
TABLE 7 around HERE
Second, we also run a regression examining the reallocation channels on the sample of multiple
bank borrowers, but use firm cluster fixed effects based on location-sector-size triples rather than
firm fixed effects. Comparing the results with firm cluster fixed effects (Panel B of Table 7) to
the results with firm fixed effects (Panel B of Table 6), we find that the realloaction coefficients
are very similar (8 out of 9 significant coefficients remain significant), which again indicates that
firm cluster fixed effects reasonably capture firm credit demand. Third, we run regressions on the
subsample of single bank borrowers only (Panel C of Table 7) and find similar effects as in the full
sample that are, if anything, statistically more significant.
All three tests thus indicate that the reduction in the precision of the coefficients in the multiple bank
borrower sample is more likely driven by the specificities of the sample than by the appropriateness
of the demand control.
4.2 Bank solvency concerns
A potential concern is that exposure to the US subprime crisis might have led to solvency problems
at Belgian banks. If these exposures are correlated with our funding shock, this could bias our
results. In this section, we therefore examine whether our results are biased due to pre-shock
bank solvency issues. Short of a measure of the direct exposure to the U.S. mortgage market, we
construct a proxy as follows. For each Belgian bank, we have the exposure to three sectors (public
sector, non-bank private sector, or banks) in a given country. We use the ultimate exposures to
the U.S. non-bank private sector and US banking sector to construct our solvency proxy.18
18The granular data is the source data used to construct the BIS consolidated international banking statistics
and is hence available on immediate and ultimate risk base. We use the ultimate exposures as they account
for net risk transfers. For example, suppose that a Belgian bank extends a loan to a company based in
Mexico and that the loan is guaranteed by a US bank. On an immediate risk basis, the exposure would
be to Mexico. However, at the ultimate risk basis, the loan is regarded as a claim of a Belgian bank on
the United States banking sector since that is where the ultimate risk resides.
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The exposure to the non-bank private sector can be seen as a proxy for exposure to U.S. households.
The exposure to the U.S. banking sector allows us to control for two related solvency concerns.
First, it allows us to proxy for the asset-side exposure to the ABCP market. Kacperczyk and
Schnabl (2010), for example, document that asset-backed commercial paper played a crucial role
during the 2007-2009 crisis, and that more than 90% of this paper was issued by the financial sector.
While ABCP was often issued by financial conduits owned by banks- and thus not directly by banks
- Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) show that a large part of the issuances was explicitly insured
by the banks. As such, the ultimate exposure to the U.S. banking sector should be a good proxy
for the exposure to the ABCP market. Second, another main part of the exposure to banks are
direct exposures to U.S. banks. Given that a large part of the U.S. banking sector was severely hit
by the crisis (Huizinga and Laeven (2012), for example, document that 60% of US bank holding
companies had a market-to-book ratio of assets below one by the end of 2008) it is reasonable to
expect that a high exposure to these banks could also lead to solvency concerns.
We calculate the sum of the ultimate exposure to U.S. banks and to the U.S. private sector for each
month during our pre-period, and then take the average over this period. We scale this average
exposure by a bank’s average total assets over this period.
Panel A of Table 8 shows that the average impact of the funding shock is still significant when
controlling for the exposure to the U.S. Moreover, compared with the results in Table 4, the coeffi-
cients associated with the funding shock remain their sign and are of similar magnitude compared.
Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 8 show the results for the full sample, while Columns 2, 4 and 6 show
the results for the sample of multiple bank borrowers. The coefficient on the U.S. exposure variable
is negative and significant, implying that banks with a higher exposure did reduce credit more than
other banks, which is in line with the expectation that the U.S. exposure variable is a good proxy
for solvency concerns.
Panel B of Table 8 shows that also our reallocation results still hold when adding the interaction
terms between this solvency proxy and the banks’ sector market share and specialization. Compared
to the baseline results in Table 5, there is only a slight reduction in coefficient size. The interaction
terms that are significant in the baseline setup remain significant when adding the solvency proxy,
with one exception being the interaction with sector market share in Column 4.
TABLE 8 around HERE
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In unreported regressions, we also use an alternative measure for solvency concerns, which is the
outflow in corporate deposits. The outflow in corporate deposits proxies for the change in uninsured
deposits, which should respond to solvency concerns (if any). Our findings are unaffected when
using this alternative solvency concern measure.
4.3 Pre-shock liquidity events
Our next test addresses a potential bias due to pre-Lehman liquidity issues. Even when banks
had no direct asset-side exposure to the ABCP market, the 2007 crisis in this market might have
affected their funding conditions. Existing studies such as Iyer, Peydro, da Rocha-Lopes et al.
(2014) and Ippolito, Peydro, Polo et al. (2016) observe that the interbank funding of Portuguese,
respectively Italian, banks dropped due to the ABCP crisis. They also show that this interbank
shock impacted bank credit supply (Portugal) or drawdowns on existing credit lines (Italy). In line
with these papers, we redo our analysis and now take 2006:6-2007:7 as pre-period and 2007:7-2008:8
as post-period. The results are reported in Table 9.
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In contrast to Iyer, Peydro, da Rocha-Lopes et al. (2014) and Ippolito, Peydro, Polo et al. (2016),
we do not find that the change in interbank funding around July 2007 is statistically significantly
related to credit supply (none of the three measures); neither for the full sample (Panel A of Table
9) nor for the multiple bank borrower sample (Panel B of Table 9). In addition, we do not find
support for the reallocation channels in this period. These results are not surprising as Figure
1 indicates that the interbank funding of Belgian banks was not yet impaired prior to Lehman.
The figure shows that funding was still growing, though slightly more volatile, after July 2007 and
(nearly) peaked around the Lehman collapse. In addition, given the resilience of Belgian banks to
the interbank funding turmoil in the summer of 2007, the results in Table 9 could also be seen as
a placebo test and are as such also reassuring for the choice of our event window.
In sum, we can be confident that our results are not affected by pre-Lehman interbank market
liquidity concerns.
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4.4 Post-shock confounding events
The largest banks operating in Belgium experienced the largest interbank funding shock, but are
at the same time also the most internationally active. One concern could be that the choices
they make in their Belgian portfolio are not independent from their cross-border portfolio choices.
Furthermore, some of these large banks received government bail-outs, which might raise concerns
on whether or not these interventions could have affected banks’ lending policies. Both concerns
imply that our results might be contaminated or driven by factors that correlate with bank size,
other than the interbank funding shock. In this section, we show that these potentially confounding
events are not driving our results.
We start by investigating the role of the adjustments in the foreign corporate lending market. An
ideal scenario would be that we have information on cross-border loans on a bank-firm basis or
bank-sectoral level. This would allow us to analyze whether banks adjust the Belgian portfolio
according to cross-border sector market share and specialization or vice versa. Unfortunately, such
data is not available. The second best is to obtain data on the total volume of cross-border lending
by bank on a monthly basis. We collect these data from the regulatory balance sheet filings of the
banks and use it to run additional tests.
We use the pre-shock share of cross-border lending in total lending, and analyze whether having
large cross-border lending operations affects credit reallocation (similar to Table 5).19 Compared
with the baseline specification (see Table 4), we find a similar effect of the interbank funding shock
on credit supply in Belgium when the pre-shock share of cross-border lending is included (as can be
seen in Panel A of Table 10). In terms of credit reallocation in response to the interbank funding
shock, there is hardly any effect on the magnitudes of the point estimates of the reallocation channels
compared to a specification without these additional cross-border lending interaction terms (panel
B of Table 10 versus Table 5).
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19We use the pre-shock share of cross-border lending and not the actual change in cross-border lending given
that the latter is jointly determined with the change in domestic lending. In unreported results we observe
a positive and significant relationship between the change in interbank funding and the change in cross-
border lending. Moreover, this relations is stronger for banks with a relatively higher share of cross-border
loans in their loan portfolio.
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Next, one might be concerned that the various government interventions may have come with some
(to us unobservable) strings attached for the banks. Anecdotal evidence on the bail-outs during our
sample period indicates that governments were almost exclusively occupied with avoiding a total
collapse of the banking sector and restoring confidence of the public in the banking sector. We
also found no indications in either the media, government sources, banks’ annual reports, nor from
informal inquiries with bank supervisors and bank sector representatives that there would have been
political pressure on banks to particularly keep lending where the bank has more market power or
is more specialized. However, it is still important to clearly spell out how these interventions might
impact our results.20
One concern could be that (i) government interventions are strongly correlated with our interbank
funding shock and that (iia) these banks were forced to keep lending or (iib) saw a smaller funding
outflow than would have been the case without bailout. It is indeed the case that there is a
relatively strong correlation between government interventions and our funding shock measure: We
find a correlation of -0.41 between a government intervention dummy and the percentage change
in interbank funding at the bank level. Now, if either scenario (iia) or (iib) is also true (which we
cannot observe), then our estimates reported in Table 4 are potentially underestimating the true
effect and thus provide a lower bound for the impact of funding shocks.
A more complicated scenario would be that (i) government interventions are strongly correlated
with our interbank funding shock and (ii) the government pushes the bank to keep lending exactly
in the sectors where that bank is most specialized and/or has a larger market share. Again point
(ii) is less straightforward and much more difficult to check. In order to show that our results are
driven by a funding shock, rather than by interventions, we set up a robustness test that focuses
on a funding shock that is far less correlated with government interventions: Deposit flows. The
correlation between a bailout dummy and the change in deposit funding in our bank sample is
only -0.20 (versus -0.41 for the interbank funding shock). Even more important, while two of the
banks which received government support in our sample experienced a strong drop in deposits
after the Lehman collapse, the two other that received government support effectively experienced
an inflow of deposits. Two large banks thus faced a bank-run on their deposits (on top of the
interbank funding dry-up),21 and a large portion of these deposits were deposited at the other
20We add a description of the guarantees and capital injections received by the large Belgian banks in the
online appendix, Section A1.
21The outflow in deposits at these two banks was substantial and amounted to -11% (-4.2%) and -13%
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banks (including the two other large banks). This automatically makes it less plausible that any
results obtained using this deposit shock are driven by bailouts. Table 11 shows the results when
using a deposit shock instead of an interbank funding shock.
TABLE 11 around HERE
Table 11 documents that the reallocation effects are similar when using the change in deposits rather
than the change in interbank funding as the shock. In fact, the statistical significance as well as the
economic magnitude are even slightly stronger, indicating that, if anything, government support
might be working against finding support for our hypotheses. Our hypotheses are based on the
profit-maximizing behavior of banks. At the same time, there exists convincing empirical evidence
that government-owned or -intervened banks behave in a non-profit maximizing way, shaping bank
outcomes such as lending (see, e.g., Sapienza (2004), Dinc (2005), Bian, Haselmann, Kick et al.
(2017)). If government support comes with strings attached (e.g., forced lending to certain sectors),
this would thus most likely not be with the idea of maximizing bank profitability in mind, which
works against our hypotheses and would thus make it harder for us to find significant results.
4.5 Further robustness
We subsequently ensure that our main reallocation results are not driven by other potential reallo-
cation effects or by underlying bank-firm specific relation characteristics.
A first important concern might stem from the existing literature on relationship lending (see, e.g.,
Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Boot, 2000; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Bolton,
Freixas, Gambacorta et al., 2016). Throughout the lending process, banks can gather firm-specific
soft information (e.g., management quality), through repeated contacts, which is difficult to observe
for outsiders. Especially banks with market power might be more likely to engage in relationship
lending (Petersen and Rajan (1995)). This information advantage can allow a bank to extract
monopoly rents (see, e.g., Sharpe (1990) or Rajan (1992)). If banks want to shield these rents and
if at the same time banks are more likely to have better firm-specific information in sectors in which
they have a strong sector market share or where they are specialized, then our main results might be
(-3.6%) of their total lending (assets).
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driven by this firm-specific information advantage. Therefore, we add two widely used relationship
lending proxies to our setup. We include the length of a bank-firm relationship, measured by the
number of months that a firm has been borrowing from a bank before September 2008. We also
add a dummy which is equal to one if the bank is the main bank of the firm, and equal to zero
otherwise, where the main bank is defined as the bank with the largest share in the total amount
granted to a firm.
Another important concern could be that our main sector reallocation results are merely picking up
other types of bank portfolio choices that happen to be related with sector choices. Two examples
of such choices are geographical bank specialization or loan maturity specialization. Some banks
might be coincidentally specialized in a sector because this sector is over-represented in the area in
which the bank is doing business. Similarly, a bank might be coincidentally specialized in a sector
because firms in that sector mainly need short term credit, and the bank happens to be specialized
in providing that type of credit. Additionally, short-term credit might be easier to cut (or not rolled
over). If sector specialization is correlated with the share of short-term lending, we could be picking
up a spurious correlation. To ensure that this is not driving our main results, we add interaction
terms of the interbank funding shock with measures of geographical market share, geographical
specialization and the sector specific maturity structure of a bank’s portfolio. Geographical market
share and specialization are calculated in a similar way as sector market share and specialization,
but on the province level instead of sector level.22 The maturity structure indicator captures the
share of loans provided by a bank to a sector that matures within one year.
TABLE 12 around HERE
Results of these extended specifications are reported in Table 12. Most importantly, including these
additional measures does not alter our main findings. The results on the reallocation effects based
on sector market share and specialization as well as firm risk are very similar compared to the
results reported in Table 6. Hence, our documented reallocation channels are robust relationships
rather than spurious correlations driven by other possible reallocation channels.
Regarding banks’ geographical orientation, we conduct two further tests, which are discussed in
detail in the online appendix (Section A2). First, rather than measuring bank market share and
22Belgium consists of ten provinces. On average, a province has one million inhabitants and spans 3,000
squared kilometers.
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bank specialization at the sector level considering Belgium as the relevant market, we now measure
it by province. This does not impact our main results. Second, a recent strand of papers on the
transmission of bank shocks in the US shows that branch presence matters for shock transmission
(Berrospide, Black, and Keeton (2016), Gilje, Loutskina, and Strahan (2016)). This is unlikely to
be of importance in our sample. Almost all loans (98%) are granted in provinces where the bank has
a branch. Moreover, we do not find that branch network density matters for credit reallocation or
that the reallaction channels documented in the body of this paper are affected by branch network
density. An interaction term between the number of branches of a bank in a province and the
interbank funding shock has the expected negative sign, but is never significant. The results of this
additional test are discussed in more detail in the online appendix.
Finally, in the online appendix (Section A3), we also shed some light on potential differences
between term credit and credit lines. On the one hand, it may seem easier for a bank to renegotiate
the committed amount on a credit line (in case it is not yet fully utilized) than to cancel term
credit. On the other hand, credit lines are also more likely to be given to better and well-known
borrowers, hence they can be considered more like relationship-based, whereas term loans are more
often seen as transactional (Berger and Udell (1995)). It thus remains an empirical issue whether
and to what extent banks shield certain types of credit when facing a funding shock. We find that
an outflow of interbank funding leads to a reduction in term credit supply. There is no statistically
significant effect on the growth in granted credit line amounts. In addition, we do find that the
average utilization rate increases following a bank funding shock. These results are consistent with
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Ippolito, Peydro, Polo et al. (2016). We also find that term
credit borrowers in sectors where the bank has a larger market share are shielded more when the
bank is hit by a funding shock. We do not find evidence of shielding in the credit line sample. It
is also reassuring that there are no reallocation effects on the change in the utilization rate. Firms
do not seem to choose drawing significantly more or less from banks with sector market share or
sector specialization, indicating that the results we find in the overall sample (or in the term credit
sample) are banks’ choices and thus supply driven and not demand driven.
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5 Expanding post-shock windows
In the online appendix (Section A4), we also present results using expanding post-shock windows
to analyze the timing of the impact of the interbank funding shock. The purpose is twofold. First
of all, such an analysis can reveal time variation in the magnitude of the impact of an interbank
funding shock on credit supply as well as in the credit reallocation channels. Secondly, it also serves
the purpose of simply showing robustness of our main results for alternative post-event horizons.
We do this expanding window analysis both on the baseline regression (as reported in Panel A of
Table 4) and on the reallocation specification with sector market share, sector specialization and
firm characteristics (Column 1 of Panel A of Table 6).
This expanding window analysis yields a number of interesting and complementary insights. First,
the results presented in Table 4 are robust to varying the length of the post-event period, except
for very short window lengths. It takes three months before the interbank funding shock starts to
have a significant impact on credit growth. The impact on increase in credit and large decreases in
credit is already significant after two months.
Furthermore, we find that the moderating impact of bank sector market share is almost instan-
taneous and stays significant until two years after the shock. Bank sector specialization on the
other hand becomes important for the reallocation of credit after about ten months and also stays
significant until two years after the shock.
The moderating effect of firm risk becomes significant three to four months after the shock. Our
results thus indicate that banks hit by a funding shock are at first more concerned with staying
afloat in the short run by focusing on loans that ensure larger cash inflows (in the form of relatively
high interest payments), while only being interested in long term profitability (and hence focusing
on protecting their sector specific knowledge) and firm risk once these short term inflows are safe.
6 Real effects: Firm investment and growth
We have shown that banks operating in Belgium transmit interbank funding shocks to their borrow-
ers according to their sector market share and specialization as well as by differentiating between
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firms with different risk profiles. In this section, we investigate how this reduction in bank loan
supply affects firm investment and growth. We analyze this in the following setup:
Real Effectf = ψ1 ∆% IBFb + ψ2 ∆% IBFb ∗ Sector market sharebs + ψ3 ∆% IBFb ∗ Sector specializationbs+
5∑
x=1
ψx+3 ∆% IBFb ∗ Firm V ariablexf + ψ9 Sector market sharebs + ψ10 Sector specializationbs+
5∑
x=1
ψx+10 Firm V ariable
x
f + φ Control V ariablesf + υs + f (6)
Real Effectf , is computed as the difference between the last available value of the variable two
years post-shock (i.e., end of 2010) and the last available value of the variable pre-shock, relative
to the last available value of total assets pre-shock. We look at a two year post-shock horizon as
changes in firms’ strategies following credit constraints usually take time to materialize and show
impact. The two dependent variables we are interested in are growth in tangible fixed assets (net
investment rate) and growth in total assets. β1 captures the extent to which the interbank funding
shock affects firms’ real outcomes. If firms borrow from multiple banks, we compute a weighted
interbank funding shock, with weights resembling the pre-shock bank-firm credit exposure. β2
and β3 capture whether the firm-level impact of the interbank funding shock varies with bank
sector market share and specialization. Additionally, we interact the interbank funding shock with
firm-specific risk, size and age variables, similar to the setup in Table 6. We also control for
accommodating sources of credit and investment or growth opportunities. This includes a measure
of whether the firm received a new loan from a bank with which it had no prior relationship
(weighted by the importance of the new loan in the post-crisis period), a measure whether a bank
has terminated a loan with the firm, a dummy measuring whether the firm has loans with multiple
banks, a measure of the change in the ratio of utilized over authorized credit, the change in the
firm’s reliance on trade credit, the firms pre-shock cash holdings, the firm’s sales growth and a set
of sector fixed effects.
Table 13 shows the corresponding results. The first two columns focus on the net investment
rate (proxied by the growth in tangible fixed assets). The results first of all indicate that firms
borrowing from banks with a larger interbank funding outflow experience a statistically significant,
though economically small, reduction in the investment rate. The point estimate of 0.083 for the
funding shock variable in Column 1 of Table 13 indicates that the average firm in our sample which
borrowed from a bank that experienced a funding shock of -10.3%, reduced its net investment rate
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by 0.85 percentage points. Interestingly, this small average result hides some important underlying
heterogeneity. Column 2 indicates that firms borrowing from banks that have a high sector market
share and large firms reduce their investment rate less than others. Based on the results in Column
2, the impact of an average interbank funding shock of -10.3% leads to a reduction of the investment
rate by -1.16 percentage points for a firm of average size that is borrowing from a bank with average
sector market share.23 A firm of average size but borrowing from a bank with an average interbank
funding shock of -10.3% for which the sector market share is one standard deviation lower, however,
reduces its net investment rate by about -1.80 percentage points. Similarly, a firm that is borrowing
from a bank with an average funding shock of -10.3% and an average sector market share but that
is a standard deviation smaller than the average firm will reduce its investment growth slightly
more than 2 percentage points. The last two columns show the impact of the interbank funding
shock on asset growth. As with investments, firms that borrow from a bank with a more negative
interbank funding shock grow slower than other firms. Reallocation effects based on firm size are
similar to the effects found for fixed assets.
TABLE 13 around HERE
Overall, we find a moderate reduction in investment and asset growth for firms that are borrowing
from banks that were hit harder by the interbank funding shock. Borrowing from a bank with
high sector market share helps to offset this negative impact on investment. While the result on
asset growth with respect to bank sector market share is similar, it is not statistically significant.
Additionally, large firms are better able to limit the reduction in investment after an interbank
funding shock. Given that Table 6 showed that there are no significant differences between small
and large firms in terms of the credit supply shock they both receive, the smaller impact in terms
of real effects for large firms might indicate that these firms have more alternative funding sources
available, over and above those controlled for.
23We use the summary statistics reported in Table 1 to calculate the impact. The average firm size is 13.38
and the average firm borrows from a bank which has a sector market share of 0.181 in its sector. As such,
the impact of an average interbank funding shock of -10.3% equals -0.103*[1.117+(0.181*-0.744)+(13.38*-
0.065)] = -1.16 percentage points. We do not take into account the remaining interaction terms given that
their impact is not statistically different from 0.
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7 Conclusion
We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the sector- and firm-specific strategies that banks follow
when their funding is affected by a negative shock. While the current literature mainly focusses on
the average impact of funding shocks on the volume of bank lending, we investigate the reallocation
that occurs across sectors and firms and its persistence over time.
To identify the reallocation in the supply of credit that follows from the difficulties for banks to
obtain funding, we rely on a unique combination of data sets. We employ monthly bank-firm
level credit data from a comprehensive credit register that contains all credit granted in Belgium
by financial institutions, monthly balance sheet data of these financial institutions, and annual
balance sheets of all registered firms.
We start by benchmarking our study with related studies. The average firm in our sample borrows
from a bank that experiences a contraction in funding equivalent to 10.3% of its total assets. We
estimate that the average firm, as a direct consequence of this funding outflow, faces a decline in
the supply of credit by 4.26%. An investigation of the timing and duration of this effect reveals that
the funding shock significantly impacts credit supply already four months after the shock started,
reaches a maximum impact after nine months, and remains significant and high up to 24 months
after the shock.
Our main results indicate that a bank’s business model, as reflected in its sector market share and
sector specialization, determines the reallocation of credit when a bank is hit by a negative funding
shock. Sector market share measures how important a bank is for a particular (non-financial) sector
while sector specialization measures how important a (non-financial) sector is for a bank. We find
that a standard deviation increase in sector market share reduces the negative impact of the funding
shock on credit supply by 22% for the average firm. Similarly, a standard deviation increase in
sector specialization reduces the negative impact of the funding shock on credit supply by 8% for
the average firm. Hence, banks direct their attention to sectors where they can more easily extract
rents (higher sector market share) or where they have built up superior knowledge (higher sector
specialization). Additionally, we document the existence of a flight to quality. Banks reallocate
credit towards firms with low debt levels, low default risk, high available collateral, and a high
interest coverage ratios. Importantly, this flight-to-quality coexists with the two aforementioned
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reallocation effects.
The reallocation effects are also robust to a number of alternative explanations. We provide evidence
that our results are not driven by pre-shock solvency problems, government interventions during
our sample period, banks’ geographical specialization, or bank-firm relationship characteristics.
On the real side, we find a moderate reduction in investments and asset growth for firms borrowing
from banks that were hit harder by the funding shock. The average firm borrowing from a bank that
experienced an average funding shock reduced its net investment rate by 0.85 percentage points.
Importantly, we show that firms that are borrowing from a bank with high sector market share can
partially offset this negative impact on investment rates.
Our results provide useful information for policy makers that want to ensure access to finance for
non-financial corporations during crisis times, as we show that riskier firms and firms borrowing
from banks that have low sector market share and specialization are more vulnerable to shocks in
the banking sector. Firms may prefer matching with banks with a larger sector market share as
the implied higher cost of borrowing during good times also acts as an insurance premium that
guarantees access to finance when the bank faces a funding shock (as in Petersen and Rajan (1995)
and Berlin and Mester (1999)). Firms might even be able to get this extra protection for free if they
borrow from a bank with high sector specialization, given that these banks do not charge higher
rates. At the same time, our results indicate that market share has a somewhat stronger shielding
effect than specialization, which might explain why firms are still willing to pay a higher price
and borrow from the high market share bank. Whether these trade-offs impact firms’ borrowing
decisions and how this affects the pool of borrowers available to banks are interesting questions for
future research.
Our findings also contain interesting information for bank regulators. Our results reveal a bright
sight of lending concentration during crisis times and are thus informative when making the trade-
off between portfolio concentration risk and having sufficient information about borrowers. Finally,
our results suggest that not only systemic risk and financial stability issues should be taken into
account when studying the welfare implications of portfolio diversification, but that it could also
be relevant to consider the potentially beneficial impact of lending concentration on firm credit
supply.
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Figure 1: Aggregate interbank funding
This figure depicts the evolution of the monthly aggregate volume (all banks active in Belgium, in EUR billion)
of interbank funding over the period 2006:1 - 2011:12. Interbank funding include overnight deposits, deposits
redeemable at notice and term accounts of other financial institutions as well as repurchase agreements. The
vertical lines correspond to the estimation window (pre-shock window and post-shock-window of thirteen
months) around the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The first line corresponds to July 2007,
the second line corresponds to August 2008, the third line corresponds to September 2009.
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Figure 2: Heterogeneous impact of a 10% interbank funding outflow on credit growth
This figure shows the expected impact of a 10 percent interbank funding outflow on credit growth for a
number of interesting scenarios as predicted by our estimations. The Figure plots the expected impact of a
funding shock, but also the expected effect for each combination of high/low bank sector market share and
high/low bank sector specialization, as well as one addition with high/low firm leverage as a firm risk proxy;
where high (low) is defined as a the mean + (-) one standard deviation.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Obs Mean StDev Min p25 p50 p75 Max
CREDIT VARIABLES
bank-firm level
∆% Creditbf 160,223 -0.024 0.278 -0.644 -0.155 -0.051 0.026 0.941
Increase in creditbf 160,223 0.289 0.453 0 0 0 1 1
Large decrease in creditbf 160,223 0.250 0.434 0 0 0 1 1
BANK VARIABLES
bank-firm level
∆% Interbank fundingb 160,223 -0.103 0.063 -0.163 -0.163 -0.110 -0.091 0.301
Capital to total assetsb 160,223 0.045 0.021 0.001 0.041 0.041 0.056 0.356
Return on equityb 160,223 0.080 0.116 -0.131 -0.072 0.106 0.172 1.009
Credit riskb 160,223 0.026 0.025 -0.203 0.007 0.027 0.055 0.213
Liquidity ratiob 160,223 0.244 0.086 0.016 0.239 0.265 0.280 0.741
Deposits to total assetsb 160,223 0.404 0.146 0.000 0.248 0.406 0.445 0.881
Interbank funding to total assetsb 160,223 0.320 0.112 0.000 0.293 0.342 0.374 0.936
Bank sizeb 160,223 11.888 1.598 5.362 11.894 12.348 13.232 13.232
bank level
∆% Interbank fundingb 38 0.020 0.119 -0.163 -0.045 -0.002 0.051 0.301
Capital to total assetsb 38 0.070 0.076 0.001 0.034 0.055 0.077 0.356
Return on equityb 38 0.152 0.254 -0.131 0.014 0.109 0.161 1.009
Credit riskb 38 0.007 0.084 -0.203 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.213
Liquidity ratiob 38 0.270 0.244 0.016 0.067 0.170 0.416 0.741
Deposits to total assetsb 38 0.473 0.263 0.000 0.286 0.512 0.668 0.881
Interbank funding to total assetsb 38 0.330 0.290 0.000 0.110 0.257 0.442 0.936
Bank sizeb 38 8.203 1.895 5.362 6.952 7.865 9.060 13.232
BANK-SECTOR VARIABLES
bank-firm level
Sector market sharebs 160,223 0.181 0.084 0.000 0.158 0.207 0.241 0.267
Sector specializationbs 160,223 0.129 0.083 0.000 0.065 0.126 0.208 0.588
bank-sector level
Sector market sharebs 402 0.038 0.075 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.017 0.267
Sector specializationbs 402 0.088 0.124 0.000 0.011 0.043 0.108 0.588
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Table 2: continued
Obs Mean StDev Min p25 p50 p75 Max
FIRM VARIABLES
bank-firm level
Total assetsf 141,762 13.38 1.288 10.79 12.47 13.24 14.16 16.46
Agef 141,762 13.97 10.19 0.615 5.615 12.46 19.61 39.53
Leveragef 141,762 0.724 0.263 0.126 0.559 0.745 0.887 1.561
Pledged collateral to fixed assetsf 141,762 0.484 0.944 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.620 4.219
Financial pressuref 141,762 0.732 0.824 0.011 0.190 0.468 0.979 4.455
firm level
Total assetsf 117,166 13.18 1.209 10.79 12.35 13.06 13.89 16.46
Agef 117,166 13.03 9.773 0.615 5.15 11.15 18.61 39.53
Leveragef 117,166 0.726 0.272 0.126 0.552 0.746 0.895 1.561
Pledged collateral to fixed assetsf 117,166 0.442 0.901 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.458 4.219
Financial pressuref 117,166 0.744 0.839 0.011 0.184 0.469 1.026 4.455
∆% Fixed assetsf 114,436 0.078 0.410 -0.435 -0.082 -0.020 0.066 2.674
∆% Assetsf 114,436 0.168 0.652 -0.681 -0.126 0.005 0.235 4.289
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Table 3: Sector market share, sector specialization, implicit interest rates, and default probabili-
ties
Panel A of this table documents the relationship, during the pre-shock period, between a firm’s implicit
interest rate (derived from the firm’s balance sheet) and the sector market share and specialization of its
bank. We only include firms borrowing from one bank to improve the match between the implicit interest
rate and the actual interest rate charged by the bank. The dependent variable in panel A is the implicit
interest rate of the firm prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and is measured as interest expenses over
financial debt. The estimated equation looks as follows:
Ratef = β1 Sector market sharebs + β2 Sector specializationbs +
δ1 Bank controlsb + δ2 Firm controlsf + αlss + f
In Column 1 of Panel A, we regress the implicit interest rate on bank sector market share, bank sector
specialization as well as firm cluster fixed effects, where clusters are based on location-sector-size (lss) triplets.
In Column 2 and 3 we subsequently add firm controls and bank controls. Panel B of this table documents
the relationship, during the pre-shock period, between borrower bankruptcy at the bank-sectoral level and
the sector market share and sector specialization of the bank. The estimated equation looks as follows:
Bankruptbs = β1 Sector market sharebs + β2 Sector specializationbs + αs + bs
The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the number of borrowers that a bank is lending to in a given
sector in the two years prior to Lehman, that go bankrupt prior to the funding shock. In Columns 3 and
4, the dependent variable is the exposure of each bank to bankruptcies in a given sector, in the pre-Lehman
period. It is computed as the ratio the total number of firms going bankrupt in a sector that borrow from
bank b to the total number of firms going bankrupt in that sector. All columns include sector fixed effects
(αs). Columns 1 and 3 include all bank-sector observations, while Columns 2 and 4 include only bank-sector
observations with strictly positive observations for the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at
the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Implicit Implicit Implicit
Panel A interest ratef interest ratef interest ratef
Sector market sharebs 0.058*** 0.039*** 0.050***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Sector specializationbs 0.016 -0.002 -0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Observations 89,926 89,926 89,926
R-squared 0.006 0.214 0.279
Firm cluster FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls No Yes Yes
Bank Controls No No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B Number of bankrupt firmsbs Share of the sector’s bankrupt firmsbs
Sector market sharebs 203.2*** 227.9*** 0.997*** 0.970***
(23.36) (23.65) (0.120) (0.108)
Sector specializationbs -10.83** -26.22** -0.041*** -0.073***
(4.349) (9.921) (0.011) (0.022)
Observations 513 246 513 246
R-squared 0.684 0.762 0.824 0.864
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Average effect of an interbank funding shock on credit supply
This table shows the effect of a shock to interbank funding (∆% Interbank fundingb) on credit
growth at the bank-firm level, while controlling for time-averaged (over the thirteen months pre-
ceding the shock) bank level covariates. The dependent variable is percentage growth in the granted
loan amount (Column 1), a dummy variable that is one if the granted amount increases and zero
otherwise (Column 2), and a dummy variable that is one if the growth in the granted loan amount
belongs to the lowest quartile and zero otherwise (Column 3). For each of the measures, we first
time-average the bank-firm exposure in the thirteen months prior to the Lehman collapse as well as
the thirteen months following the Lehman collapse. We subsequently compute logarithmic growth
rates of the pre versus post Lehman time-averaged loan amounts. The independent variable of in-
terest is the change in interbank funding scaled by total assets. More specifically, it is the average
value of interbank funding in the thirteen months post Lehman minus the average value in the
thirteen months prior to the Lehman collapse, scaled by the average value of total assets over the
thirteen months preceding 2008:09. The table consists of two panels. Panel A reports the results
for specifications with the full sample, where we control for firm demand using firm cluster FE.
Firm clusters are based on location-sector-size triplets for single-bank firms and on the firm itself
for multiple-bank firms. Panel B reports the results for specifications with the sample of firms
borrowing from multiple banks only in which case we control for firm demand using firm FE. Bank
control variables are included in both panels, but not reported in Panel B. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Full sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb 0.414*** 0.586* -0.877***
(0.121) (0.330) (0.174)
Capital to total assetsb -0.081 -0.228 0.224
(0.194) (0.443) (0.233)
Return on equityb -0.074 -0.072 0.151
(0.056) (0.110) (0.092)
Credit riskb 0.509*** 0.646** -0.853***
(0.117) (0.301) (0.166)
Liquidity ratiob 0.078 -0.045 -0.243*
(0.070) (0.161) (0.122)
Deposits to total assetsb -0.078 -0.309 0.051
(0.087) (0.212) (0.132)
Interbank funding to total assetsb -0.057 -0.219 0.007
(0.086) (0.185) (0.112)
Bank sizeb -0.007 -0.009 0.025**
(0.006) (0.013) (0.009)
Observations 160,223 160,223 160,223
R-squared 0.295 0.276 0.290
Firm cluster FE Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: Multiple-bank borrowers sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb 0.438*** 0.597** -0.630***
(0.129) (0.260) (0.204)
Observations 47,205 47,205 47,205
R-squared 0.455 0.463 0.481
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Within bank credit reallocation according to sector market share and sector specialization
This table contains information on the estimated effect of interbank funding shock (∆% Interbank
fundingb) on credit supply, conditional on banks’ sector market share and sector specialization. The
dependent variable is percentage growth in the granted loan amount (Column 1), a dummy variable that
is one if the granted amount increases and zero otherwise (Column 2), and a dummy variable that is
one if the growth in the granted loan amount belongs to the lowest quartile and zero otherwise (Column
3). The independent variables of interest are the interaction between bank sector market share and
sector specialization and the interbank funding shock. Panel A reports the results for specifications with
the full sample, where we control for firm demand using firm cluster FE. Firm clusters are based on
location-sector-size triplets for single-bank firms and on the firm itself for multiple-bank firms. Panel
B reports the results for specifications with the sample of firms borrowing from multiple banks only
where we control for firm demand using firm fixed effects. We control for all observed and unobserved
bank-specific covariates by including bank fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Full sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector market sharebs -1.029*** -2.056*** 1.599***
(0.309) (0.455) (0.436)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector specializationbs -0.218* -0.374 0.874***
(0.115) (0.349) (0.178)
Sector market sharebs -0.114** -0.299*** 0.246***
(0.052) (0.099) (0.054)
Sector specializationbs 0.007 0.103 -0.045
(0.037) (0.081) (0.048)
Observations 160,223 160,223 160,223
R-squared 0.298 0.282 0.292
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: Multiple-bank borrowers sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector market sharebs -1.589*** -1.456** 1.235
(0.571) (0.581) (1.088)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector specializationbs -0.190 -0.783* 1.239***
(0.268) (0.413) (0.439)
Sector market sharebs -0.164* -0.162 0.183
(0.082) (0.113) (0.164)
Sector specializationbs 0.00446 0.0434 -0.126
(0.058) (0.101) (0.118)
Observations 47,205 47,205 47,205
R-squared 0.460 0.469 0.486
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Heterogenous shock transmission: Sector market share, sector specialization and the role
of firm characteristics
This table shows the impact of an interbank funding shock (∆% Interbank fundingb) on credit supply, conditional
on banks’ sector market share, banks’ sector specialization and firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, leverage,
pledged collateral to fixed assets and financial pressure). We simultaneously include these variables and their
interaction with the funding shock. The dependent variable is percentage growth in the granted loan amount
(Column 1), a dummy variable that is one if the granted amount increases and zero otherwise (Column 2), and
a dummy variable that is one if the growth in the granted loan amount belongs to the lowest quartile and zero
otherwise (Column 3). Panel A reports the results for specifications with the full sample, where we control for firm
demand using firm cluster FE. Firm clusters are based on location-sector-size triplets for single-bank firms and
on the firm itself for multiple-bank firms. Panel B reports the results for specifications with the sample of firms
borrowing from multiple banks only where we control for firm demand using firm FE. We control for all observed
and unobserved bank-specific covariates by including bank fixed effects. Firm controls include all interacted firm
characteristics. Bank-sector controls include bank sector market share and specialization. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Full sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector market sharebs -0.875*** -1.499*** 1.137*
(0.235) (0.372) (0.571)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector specializationbs -0.334** -0.426 0.942***
(0.146) (0.343) (0.213)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Total assetsf 0.016 0.008 -0.006
(0.030) (0.061) (0.026)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Agef 0.001 -0.007*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Leveragef 0.178*** 0.405*** -0.224
(0.048) (0.136) (0.167)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Pledged collateral to fixed assetsf 0.026** 0.029 -0.049**
(0.010) (0.021) (0.020)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Financial pressuref 0.061*** 0.061** -0.062***
(0.016) (0.030) (0.020)
Observations 141,762 141,762 141,762
R-squared 0.364 0.320 0.337
Firm and bank-sector controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE and Firm cluster FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Multiple-bank borrowers sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector market sharebs -1.429** -0.454 1.346
(0.653) (0.818) (1.548)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector specializationbs -0.355 -0.931* 1.261**
(0.275) (0.475) (0.485)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Total assetsf -0.007 -0.008 0.031
(0.042) (0.070) (0.023)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Agef 0.004 0.000 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Leveragef 0.335*** 0.833*** -0.408**
(0.090) (0.300) (0.181)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Pledged collateral to fixed assetsf 0.009 -0.014 -0.009
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Financial pressuref 0.103*** 0.097** -0.090***
(0.028) (0.046) (0.027)
Observations 44,904 44,904 44,904
R-squared 0.459 0.469 0.485
Bank-sector controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE and Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: The importance of demand control (firm fixed effects vs. firm cluster fixed effects) and
sample composition (multiple-bank borrowers vs. single-bank borrowers)
This table shows the impact of an interbank funding shock (∆% Interbank fundingb) on credit supply (Panel A), and the
heterogenous impact conditional on banks’ sector market share, banks’ sector specialization and firm characteristics (Panels B
and C). Panels A and B reports the results for specifications with the sample of multiple-bank borrowers only, whereas Panel
C reports the results for specifications with the sample of single-bank borrowers only. Importantly, in all panels we control for
firms’ credit demand using firm cluster FE, where clusters are based on location-sector-size triplets. The dependent variable is
percentage growth in the granted loan amount (Column 1), a dummy variable that is one if the granted amount increases and
zero otherwise (Column 2), and a dummy variable that is one if the growth in the granted loan amount belongs to the lowest
quartile and zero otherwise (Column 3). We include bank fixed effects in Panels B and C. Firm controls include all interacted
firm characteristics. Bank-sector controls include bank sector market share and specialization. Standard errors are clustered at
the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Multiple-bank borrowers sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb 0.417*** 0.616* -0.642***
(0.142) (0.321) (0.201)
Observations 44,904 44,904 44,904
R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.249
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Multiple-bank borrowers sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector market sharebs -1.526*** -1.162 1.633
(0.409) (1.103) (1.185)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector specializationbs -0.081 -0.584 1.127**
(0.298) (0.501) (0.496)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Total assetsf -0.002 -0.006 0.030
(0.041) (0.066) (0.025)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Agef 0.002 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Leveragef 0.270*** 0.533** -0.400*
(0.098) (0.229) (0.228)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Pledged collateral to fixed assetsf 0.020 0.010 -0.042
(0.023) (0.024) (0.036)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Financial pressuref 0.110*** 0.142*** -0.098***
(0.023) (0.039) (0.031)
Observations 44,904 44,904 44,904
R-squared 0.244 0.236 0.265
Firm and bank-sector controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE and bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Single-bank borrowers sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector market sharebs -0.905*** -2.219*** 1.268**
(0.212) (0.413) (0.541)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector specializationbs -0.372** -0.362 0.808***
(0.148) (0.440) (0.249)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Total assetsf 0.006 0.017 -0.007
(0.028) (0.059) (0.043)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Agef -0.001 -0.010** 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Leveragef 0.138*** 0.327** -0.191
(0.049) (0.147) (0.171)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Pledged collateral to fixed assetsf 0.034** 0.052* -0.069**
(0.015) (0.028) (0.033)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Financial pressuref 0.053*** 0.050 -0.057***
(0.016) (0.036) (0.020)
Observations 96,855 96,855 96,855
R-squared 0.314 0.246 0.272
Firm and bank-sector controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE and bank FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: Robustness on pre-shock confounding events: Potential solvency issues
This table shows the effect of a shock to interbank funding (∆% Interbank fundingb) on credit growth at the
bank-firm level, while controlling for solvency concerns. Our proxy for solvency concerns is a bank’s exposure
to the U.S. housing and mortgage market. US exposureb is constructed using monthly bank-level data used to
construct the BIS consolidated international banking statistics. More specifically, we take the average ultimate
risk exposures to the U.S. non-bank private sector and US banking sector pre-shock, scaled by average total
assets pre-shock. The dependent variable is percentage growth in the granted loan amount (Columns 1 and
2), a dummy variable that is one if the granted amount increases and zero otherwise (Columns 3 and 4), and
a dummy variable that is one if the growth in the granted loan amount belongs to the lowest quartile and
zero otherwise (Columns 5 and 6). Panel A shows the results for the average impact of the funding shock on
bank lending when controlling for banks’ exposure to the U.S. housing and mortgage market. Panel B shows
the reallocation results when controlling for potential reallocation effects due to banks’ exposure to the U.S.
housing and mortgage market. We report the results for specifications with the full sample where we control for
firm demand using firm cluster FE (Columns 1, 3 and 5) and for the sample of firms borrowing from multiple
banks where we control for firm demand using firm FE (Columns 2, 4 and 6). In the full sample, firm clusters
are based on location-sector-size triplets for single-bank firms and on the firm itself for multiple-bank firms.
Bank controls include bank capitalization, profitability, credit risk, liquidity, stable deposit funding, and size.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A ∆% Creditbf Increase in creditbf Large decrease in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb 0.379*** 0.484*** 0.538* 0.641** -0.816*** -0.705***
(0.096) (0.113) (0.289) (0.253) (0.120) (0.163)
US exposureb -0.560*** -0.573*** -0.782** -0.545* 1.001*** 0.921***
(0.139) (0.135) (0.370) (0.298) (0.162) (0.196)
Observations 160,223 47,205 160,223 47,205 160,223 47,205
R-squared 0.296 0.456 0.277 0.464 0.291 0.482
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B ∆% Creditbf Increase in creditbf Large decrease in creditbf
∆% IBFb * Sector market sharebs -0.872** -1.143* -1.656*** -0.746 1.582*** 0.806
(0.335) (0.667) (0.537) (0.540) (0.463) (1.210)
∆% IBFb * Sector specializationbs -0.253* -0.404 -0.479 -1.171*** 0.880*** 1.381***
(0.133) (0.336) (0.372) (0.419) (0.173) (0.490)
US exposureb * Sector market sharebs 1.327 2.835 2.317 2.897 0.026 -5.017
(2.787) (3.216) (3.907) (4.372) (3.359) (4.041)
US exposureb * Sector specializationbs 0.767 1.822* 2.469 3.422** -0.172 -1.028
(0.782) (0.928) (1.520) (1.427) (0.844) (0.935)
Observations 160,223 47,205 160,223 47,205 160,223 47,205
R-squared 0.298 0.460 0.282 0.469 0.292 0.486
Bank-sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 9: Robustness on pre-shock confounding events: Potential liquidity issues surrounding the
ABCP shock in July 2007
This table shows the effect of a shock to interbank funding (∆% IBFb) on credit growth at the bank-firm
level, assuming that the shock took place in July 2007 (i.e., the start of the ABCP crisis). The pre-shock
period consists of the thirteen months prior to the ABCP shock (2006:7-2007:7) and the post-shock period
consists of the thirteen months after to the ABCP shock (2007:8-2008:8) and thus stops right before the
Lehman collapse. The table shows both the average effect (Columns 1, 3, and 5) and heterogenous effect
based on banks’ sector market share and sector specialization (Columns 2, 4, and 6). The dependent
variable is percentage growth in the granted loan amount (Columns 1 and 2), a dummy variable that is one
if the granted amount increases and zero otherwise (Columns 3 and 4), and a dummy variable that is one
if the growth in the granted loan amount belongs to the lowest quartile and zero otherwise (Columns 5 and
6). Panel A reports the results for specifications with the full sample, where we control for firm demand
using firm cluster FE. Firm clusters are based on location-sector-size triplets for single-bank firms and on
the firm itself for multiple-bank firms. Panel B reports the results for specifications with the sample of
firms borrowing from multiple banks only where we control for firm demand using firm FE. Bank controls
include bank capitalization, profitability, credit risk, liquidity, stable deposit funding, and size. Bank-sector
controls include bank sector market share and specialization. Standard errors are clustered at the bank
level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Full sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in Large decrease
creditbf in creditbf
∆% IBFb -0.163 -0.199 -0.009
(0.098) (0.215) (0.126)
∆% IBFb * Sector market sharebs -0.365 -1.114 0.565
(0.421) (0.710) (1.042)
∆% IBFb * Sector specializationbs 0.004 -0.050 0.489**
(0.182) (0.322) (0.233)
Observations 153,854 153,854 153,854 153,854 153,854 153,854
R-squared 0.309 0.312 0.289 0.298 0.290 0.293
Bank controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Bank-sector controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shock timing 2007/07 2007/07 2007/07 2007/07 2007/07 2007/07
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: Multiple-bank borrowers sample ∆% Creditbf
Increase in Large decrease
creditbf in creditbf
∆% IBFb -0.027 0.069 -0.010
(0.114) (0.189) (0.151)
∆% IBFb * Sector market sharebs -0.749 -2.766 -0.185
(0.866) (1.926) (1.191)
∆% IBFb * Sector specializationbs 0.559 0.646 -0.055
(0.351) (0.777) (0.443)
Observations 45,905 45,905 45,905 45,905 45,905 45,905
R-squared 0.460 0.464 0.475 0.485 0.477 0.482
Bank controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Bank-sector controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shock timing 2007/07 2007/07 2007/07 2007/07 2007/07 2007/07
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Table 10: Robustness on post-shock confounding events: Potential impact of cross-border lending
This table shows the effect of a shock to interbank funding (∆% Interbank fundingb) on credit growth at the
bank-firm level, while controlling for the bank’s pre-shock cross-border corporate lending share. The dependent
variable is percentage growth in the granted loan amount (Columns 1 and 2), a dummy variable that is one if
the granted amount increases and zero otherwise (Columns 3 and 4), and a dummy variable that is one if the
growth in the granted loan amount belongs to the lowest quartile and zero otherwise (Columns 5 and 6). Panel
A shows the results for the average impact of the funding shock on bank lending when controlling for a bank’s
pre-shock cross-border corporate lending share. Panel B shows the reallocation results when controlling for
potential reallocation effects depending on bank’s pre-shock cross-border corporate lending share. We report
the results for specifications with the full sample where we control for firm demand using firm cluster fixed
effects (Columns 1, 3 and 5) and for the sample of firms borrowing from multiple banks where we control
for firm demand using firm fixed effects (Columns 2, 4 and 6). In the full sample, firm clusters are based on
location-sector-size triplets for single-bank firms and on the firm itself for multiple-bank firms. Bank controls
include bank capitalization, profitability, credit risk, liquidity, stable deposit funding, and size. Standard errors
are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A ∆% Creditbf
Increase in Large decrease
creditbf in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb 0.423*** 0.430*** 0.614* 0.585** -0.861*** -0.648***
(0.116) (0.139) (0.321) (0.273) (0.170) (0.215)
Cross-border lendingb 0.059 0.029 0.166 0.049 0.099 0.071
(0.048) (0.069) (0.110) (0.114) (0.063) (0.088)
Observations 160,223 47,205 160,223 47,205 160,223 47,205
R-squared 0.295 0.455 0.276 0.463 0.290 0.481
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B ∆% Creditbf
Increase in Large decrease
creditbf in creditbf
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector market sharebs -0.920*** -1.357** -1.830*** -1.032** 1.584*** 1.015
(0.314) (0.549) (0.454) (0.506) (0.341) (0.734)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector specializationbs -0.217* -0.227 -0.413 -0.902** 0.806*** 1.123**
(0.124) (0.265) (0.364) (0.389) (0.197) (0.451)
Cross-border lendingb * Sector market sharebs -1.132 -1.957 -0.680 -2.296 2.991** 5.580***
(0.957) (1.429) (1.310) (2.037) (1.328) (2.016)
Cross-border lendingb * Sector specializationbs 0.426** 0.471** 0.763* 0.905** -0.266 -0.318
(0.163) (0.215) (0.426) (0.442) (0.306) (0.297)
Observations 160,223 47,205 160,223 47,205 160,223 47,205
R-squared 0.298 0.460 0.282 0.469 0.292 0.486
Bank-sector controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 11: Robustness on post-shock confounding events: Potential impact of bank bail-outs
This table contains information on the estimated effect of deposit shocks (∆% Depositsb) on credit supply,
conditional on banks’ sector market share and sector specialization. The dependent variable is percentage
growth in the granted loan amount (Column 1), a dummy variable that is one if the granted amount increases
and zero otherwise (Column 2), and a dummy variable that is one if the growth in the granted loan amount
belongs to the lowest quartile and zero otherwise (Column 3). The independent variables of interest are
the interaction between bank sector market share and sector specialization and the deposit shock. Panel A
reports the results for specifications with the full sample, where we control for firm demand using firm cluster
FE. Firm clusters are based on location-sector-size triplets for single-bank firms and on the firm itself for
multiple-bank firms. Panel B reports the results for specifications with the sample of firms borrowing from
multiple banks only where we control for firm demand using firm fixed effects. We control for all observed
and unobserved bank-specific covariates by including bank fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Depositsb * Sector market sharebs -1.501*** -2.564*** 2.839***
(0.464) (0.613) (0.866)
∆% Depositsb * Sector specializationbs -0.526** -1.600*** 0.937***
(0.210) (0.486) (0.270)
Sector market sharebs -0.010 -0.121 0.053
(0.038) (0.082) (0.057)
Sector specializationbs 0.038 0.204** -0.101*
(0.040) (0.093) (0.056)
Observations 160,223 160,223 160,223
R-squared 0.298 0.282 0.292
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel B ∆% Creditbf
Increase in
creditbf
Large decrease
in creditbf
∆% Depositsb * Sector market sharebs -2.421*** -2.047*** 3.013*
(0.648) (0.664) (1.751)
∆% Depositsb * Sector specializationbs -0.733 -2.250*** 2.317***
(0.494) (0.755) (0.525)
Sector market sharebs -0.009 -0.043 0.065
(0.075) (0.094) (0.118)
Sector specializationbs 0.051 0.195 -0.282**
(0.081) (0.118) (0.120)
Observations 47,205 47,205 47,205
R-squared 0.460 0.469 0.486
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12: Robustness: Geographic specialization, loan maturity and relationship strength
This table investigates alternative reallocation scenarios of the interbank funding shock (∆%Interbank
fundingb) based on geographical bank market share and specialization, loan maturity specialization and bank-
firm relationship lending. The dependent variable is percentage growth in the granted loan amount (Columns
1 and 2), a dummy variable that is one if the granted amount increases and zero otherwise (Columns 3 and
4), and a dummy variable that is one if the growth in the granted loan amount belongs to the lowest quartile
and zero otherwise (Columns 5 and 6). Both geographical market share and specialization are calculated in
a similar way as sector market share and specialization, but at the province level instead of the sector level.
The maturity structure indicator captures, at the bank-sector level, the share of loans that matures in more
than one year. The two relationship lending proxies are the length of a bank-firm relationship, proxied by the
number of months that a firm has an outstanding loan with a bank before 2008:9, and a dummy indicating
whether a bank is the main bank of a firm, calculated as the bank from which a bank borrows its largest
share of credit in the thirteen months before 2008:9. Odd columns contain the results for specifications with
the full sample, where we control for firm demand using firm cluster fixed effects. Firm clusters are based on
location-sector-size triplets for single-bank firms and on the firm itself for multiple-bank firms. Even columns
contain the results for specifications with the sample of firms borrowing from multiple banks where we control
for firm demand using firm fixed effects. We control for all observed and unobserved bank-specific covariates
by including bank fixed effects. Firm controls include all interacted firm characteristics. Bank-sector and
bank-firm controls include interacted bank-sector and bank-firm characteristics. Standard errors are clustered
at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆% Creditbf
Increase in Large decrease
creditbf in creditbf
∆% IBFb * Sector market sharebs -0.750** -0.877 -1.401*** 0.0949 1.093** 0.801
(0.290) (0.649) (0.445) (0.537) (0.427) (1.401)
∆% IBFb * Sector specializationbs -0.468** -1.126*** -0.602 -1.804*** 1.092** 2.045**
(0.218) (0.335) (0.468) (0.432) (0.416) (0.793)
∆% IBFb * Total assetsf 0.021 0.006 0.040 0.037 -0.027 -0.014
(0.024) (0.038) (0.057) (0.065) (0.031) (0.025)
∆% IBFb * Agef -0.000 0.001 -0.007** -0.002 0.003 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
∆% IBFb * Leveragef 0.203*** 0.400*** 0.468*** 0.988*** -0.278 -0.544***
(0.047) (0.090) (0.137) (0.302) (0.171) (0.187)
∆% IBFb * Pledged collateralf 0.025** 0.011 0.029 -0.017 -0.048** -0.012
(0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023)
∆% IBFb * Financial Pressuref 0.059*** 0.101*** 0.058** 0.101** -0.055*** -0.087***
(0.015) (0.029) (0.028) (0.048) (0.018) (0.029)
∆% IBFb * Geographical market sharebp 1.748* 1.524 3.296** 4.629** -0.868 -0.484
(0.926) (1.209) (1.535) (1.929) (1.147) (1.998)
∆% IBFb * Geographical specializationbp -0.101 -0.0291 -0.462** -0.667** -0.110 -0.368
(0.126) (0.245) (0.213) (0.307) (0.234) (0.362)
∆% IBFb * Maturity structurebs -0.099 -0.583** -0.0245 -0.627* 0.081 0.592
(0.190) (0.274) (0.320) (0.344) (0.319) (0.397)
∆% IBFb * Length of relationbf -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
∆% IBFb * Main bankbf 0.0345 0.125** 0.260*** 0.409*** -0.202 -0.332**
(0.045) (0.061) (0.054) (0.091) (0.129) (0.131)
Observations 141,762 44,904 141,762 44,904 141,762 44,904
R-squared 0.370 0.470 0.322 0.477 0.344 0.496
Firm controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Bank-sector and bank-firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 13: Real effects: Firm investment and growth
This table investigates the impact of the interbank funding shock (∆% Interbank fundingb) on firm in-
vestment and firm growth. Firm investment is proxied by the growth in tangible fixed assets (Columns
1 and 2), firm growth is measured as the growth in total assets (Columns 3 and 4). The growth rate
for both variables is computed as the difference between the last available value of the variable two
years post-shock (i.e., end of 2010) and the last available value of the variable pre-shock, scaled by the
last available value of total assets pre-shock. The independent variables of interest are the shock to
interbank funding (∆% Interbank fundingb) and its interactions with bank-sector-specific and firm-
specific characteristics. The set of characteristics we consider is identical to the ones in Table 6. We
include bank sector market share, bank sector specialization, firm size, firm age, leverage, pledged col-
lateral to fixed assets, financial pressure, and cash holdings. The regressions include further controls
for whether the firm received an additional loan from a new bank, for whether a bank terminated
a loan with a firm, for whether the firm is borrowing from more than one bank, for the change in
the ratio of utilized over authorized credit, for whether the firm increased its reliance on trade credit
and for growth opportunities by including the firm’s sales growth over the period and a set of sector
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05 and
p<0.1 respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆% Fixed assetsf ∆% Assetsf
∆% Interbank fundingb 0.083** 1.114*** 0.041 1.073*
(0.040) (0.423) (0.054) (0.647)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector market sharebs -0.834*** -0.787
(0.279) (0.537)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Sector specializationbs 0.002 0.291
(0.206) (0.348)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Total assetsf -0.064** -0.073
(0.028) (0.045)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Agef -0.004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Leveragef -0.184 -0.095
(0.119) (0.167)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Pledged collateral to fixed assetsf -0.005 -0.008
(0.019) (0.022)
∆% Interbank fundingb * Financial pressuref -0.008 -0.003
(0.018) (0.036)
Observations 114,435 114,435 114,435 114,435
R-squared 0.152 0.152 0.337 0.337
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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